Taiwan finds itself at a critical juncture, grappling with relentless pressure from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the uncertain disposition of its primary international partner, the United States. Domestically, political divisions are deepening, while China's strategy of "coercion without violence" is amplifying anxieties across Taiwanese society. In this precarious environment, the imperative for the United States and Taiwan to forge new avenues of mutually beneficial cooperation and support has never been more acute.
China's Strategy of "Coercion Without Violence"
Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, China has relentlessly pursued what Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Richard Bush termed "coercion without violence"—a long-term strategy aimed at eroding Taiwanese confidence in their future without resorting to military conflict. Beijing employs a multifaceted array of non-violent tools, including persistent military intimidation, economic inducements and sanctions, diplomatic isolation, clandestine operations, organized crime, cyberattacks, and the dissemination of disinformation. The objective is to instill in the Taiwanese people a sense of futility in resisting and an eventual acceptance of their destined subjugation to Beijing's will.
Upon her initial inauguration, President Tsai extended a sincere olive branch to Beijing, signaling her commitment to maintaining the status quo. In her 2016 inaugural address, she underscored her dedication to preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and her openness to cross-strait dialogue. She further affirmed that cross-strait affairs would be handled in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland 1 Area—a tacit acknowledgment of the existing legal framework of "one China" and a commitment not to pursue formal Taiwanese independence. President Tsai even recognized the historical fact of interactions between the two sides of the Strait in 1992 and the spirit of "seeking common ground while reserving differences," advocating for peaceful coexistence.
However, Beijing rebuffed President Tsai's overtures, dismissing them as an "incomplete test paper" due to the absence of an explicit endorsement of the "1992 Consensus." Rather than embracing ambiguity, China insisted on complete acquiescence to its demands. Subsequently, Beijing doubled down on its strategy of "coercion without violence," a campaign of pressure that continues unabated.
Despite this, President Tsai proved to be a leader with a profound understanding of international affairs and a measured, systematic approach to governance. As a trained trade negotiator, she carefully weighed the implications of her words and actions, making policy decisions with deliberate caution.
The Dawn of the Lai Ching-te Era and Escalating Cross-Strait Tensions
When Lai Ching-te succeeded Tsai Ing-wen in 2024, he harbored no illusions of a breakthrough in easing cross-strait tensions or resuming direct dialogue with Beijing. Having served as Tsai's premier and vice president, he had witnessed firsthand her efforts to manage cross-strait tensions and Beijing's recalcitrant posture. No matter what President Tsai said or did, China consistently intensified its pressure on Taiwan and its efforts to isolate the island on the international stage. President Lai's track record in office reflects his anticipation that Beijing will continue to ratchet up pressure on Taiwan regardless of his pronouncements or actions during his presidency.
Rather than seeking rapprochement with China, President Lai has focused on deterring Beijing's growing influence and bolstering Taiwan's resilience. This approach has contributed to heightened political tensions within Taiwan, where the Legislative Yuan is narrowly controlled by the main opposition parties. Taiwan's competitive political factions have long sought to tilt the political landscape in their favor. In this context, over the past year, the legislature has passed laws expanding its powers to check the president's authority. When Taiwan's Constitutional Court ruled some of these provisions unconstitutional, the legislature retaliated by passing another law making it difficult for President Lai to secure a quorum of constitutional court justices, effectively paralyzing his appointment power.
Taiwan's political system is currently in significant disarray, and President Lai's approval ratings are declining. Public sentiment regarding Taiwan's future is also shifting negatively. According to a recent report in The Economist, Wu Jieh-min, a research fellow at Academia Sinica, Taiwan's foremost research institution, noted that "over 80 percent of Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo, but only about 20 percent think that is sustainable in the long term." While only about 4 percent of Taiwanese favor unification, when asked about their expected future rather than their preference, roughly 30 percent now say they expect to be unified with the mainland—an 8-point increase since 2020.
For Beijing, these outcomes can be viewed as a return on its investment in "coercion without violence." Rather than having to use force to compel the Taiwanese people to its will, Beijing would much prefer that they conclude on their own that integration with the mainland is the best path to a better future. As long as Taiwan's major political parties remain consumed by internal power struggles, they will struggle to mount a united front against the primary policy challenge facing Taiwan: the threat from China.
Deepening Doubts About American Reliability
Beijing's psychological offensive aimed at undermining the will of the Taiwanese people is further bolstered by growing doubts within Taiwan regarding the reliability of the United States. According to the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation, a staggering 60 percent of Taiwanese people do not trust the United States under President Donald Trump.
While there was once an implicit belief that Taiwan and the United States were bound by a firm commitment to shared values, this is no longer the case under the Trump administration. Taiwanese people, particularly after President Trump appeared to blame Ukraine for Russia's illegal invasion, have lost confidence that the United States will come to the defense of an attacked ally. President Trump's announcement of a potential 32 percent tariff on Taiwanese imports further underscored for the Taiwanese his transactional and unsentimental approach to bilateral relations. Moreover, anxieties persist among Taiwan policy experts that President Trump could use Taiwan as a political pawn in future negotiations with Chinese President Xi Jinping. When Washington's approach to Taiwan policy is perceived as driven by personal agendas and internal contradictions, both Taiwan's interests and U.S. national interests are inevitably undermined.
In short, the image of the United States in Taiwan is significantly tarnished. This is not the moment for American leaders to publicly lecture or hector their Taiwanese counterparts. Such demands will likely be disregarded and could breed lasting resentment, further eroding American influence in the long run.
A Shared Agenda for the United States and Taiwan
Instead, if Washington seeks to maintain the dynamic balance in the Taiwan Strait in the face of relentless Chinese pressure—to tilt the status quo in a direction it prefers—it must find ways to effectively counter Beijing's efforts to erode Taiwanese confidence. Given President Trump's ambiguous stance on ideological pronouncements and his perceived lack of commitment to defending security partners, any effort to bolster Taiwanese confidence in their future must be pragmatic to be persuasive. To gain trust, such signals must be rooted in American national interests, not appeals to lofty values or ideology.
The practical case for strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations rests on the fact that both sides offer something the other needs. Taiwan is short on energy, land, and talent, while the United States possesses an abundance of the very resources Taiwan lacks. In other areas, Taiwan is ahead while the United States lags behind.
For example, the United States has ample energy production capacity to sustain Taiwan's economic growth and support its energy security. From geothermal and nuclear power to liquefied natural gas and advanced grid technologies, the U.S. is resource-rich, while Taiwan is not. As Taiwan builds more advanced semiconductor foundries, data centers for artificial intelligence (AI) servers, and advanced manufacturing hubs, its energy demands will only increase, and the United States can help meet those needs. The U.S. is also the world's largest market and a leader in many advanced technology research fields—including the weapons systems Taiwan will need to produce at scale to enhance its own defense.
Conversely, without Taiwan, the U.S. vision of reindustrialization cannot be realized. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's (TSMC) $165 billion commitment to invest in the United States will serve as a massive catalyst for developing America's advanced technology manufacturing ecosystem. This ecosystem will attract other key players in the semiconductor and advanced manufacturing value chains, helping to rebuild domestic capacity in critical technologies. Without these inputs, the prospects for President Trump's vision of American reindustrialization are significantly diminished.
Sustained communication at authoritative levels will provide the bedrock for mutually beneficial cooperation. Through collaboration, both sides can more closely align their destinies and accelerate the development of new technological innovations. Some may raise concerns that such investments could lead to the hollowing out of Taiwan's industrial base. However, given the soaring global demand for advanced microchips to power the AI revolution, the author is confident that Taiwan's role as a global hub for chip production will not be diminished.
Taiwan's internal political divisions and the erosion of trust in American reliability provide fertile ground for Beijing's long-term efforts to undermine Taiwanese confidence in their future. Faced with these challenges, this is not the time for the United States to pressure Taiwan to follow its dictates. If the Trump administration has any lecturing to do regarding stability in the Taiwan Strait, it should be directed at Beijing. China's steady escalation of coercive actions over the past decade has done far more to heighten the risks in the Taiwan Strait than any pronouncements from either President Lai or President Tsai. As the saying goes, actions speak louder than words.
Faced with these challenges, now is the time for Washington and Taipei to pursue a shared agenda for mutual benefit. As the AI revolution accelerates, the United States and Taiwan offer each other what the other needs and are well-positioned to meet the demands of the age. Both nations must seize this opportunity and not let it pass.
[Copyright (c) Global Economic Times. All Rights Reserved.]
