SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA – Following a fatal sinkhole incident in Gangdong-gu, Seoul, where a motorcyclist in his 30s died, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) is facing criticism for its decision not to disclose the ‘Sinkhole Risk Map.’ This stance is raising concerns, drawing parallels to the Seongsu Bridge collapse 31 years ago.   

According to the SMG and other sources on April 7th, a 20-meter wide and 18-meter deep sinkhole occurred on March 24th at an intersection near Daemyeong Elementary School in Myeongil-dong, Gangdong-gu, resulting in the death of a male motorcyclist in his 30s.

Even before the shock of this incident subsided, another sinkhole, measuring 20cm in width and 50cm in depth, appeared on April 2nd on Cheonjung-ro in front of Shinmyeong Elementary School in Gyeongdong-gu. While no casualties were reported, the fact that this location is approximately 850 meters from the fatal sinkhole site near Daemyeong Elementary School has amplified public anxiety.

With the rainy season, which typically sees an increase in sinkhole occurrences, approaching, there are growing calls for the SMG to publicly release the ‘Sinkhole Safety Map (Priority Maintenance Zone Map)’ that was completed last year.   

The Sinkhole Safety Map categorizes the entire Seoul area into five risk levels based on the likelihood of sinkholes. Areas with aging water pipes or ongoing underground construction are reportedly classified as high-risk zones.

While the public release of this map would allow residents and workers to understand the sinkhole risk in their respective areas and take necessary precautions, the Seoul Metropolitan Government maintains its position against disclosure.

In response, the SMG stated, "This map was developed for internal management reference to enhance the efficiency of Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) surveys and cannot be considered as definitive data indicating the risk of ground subsidence in itself."

The city also added, "The risk classification for management purposes reflects various factors, and public disclosure could lead to incorrect conclusions or unnecessary misunderstandings and anxiety."

[Seoul = Newsis] Reporter Hwang Jun-sun = Members of the Public Transport Workers' Union hold a press conference in front of Seoul City Hall in Jung-gu, Seoul on the morning of April 2nd, demanding the immediate public release of Seoul's sinkhole safety map. 2025.04.02. hwang@newsis.com [Seoul = Newsis] Reporter Hwang Jun-sun = Members of the Public Transport Workers' Union hold a press conference in front of Seoul City Hall in Jung-gu, Seoul on the morning of April 2nd, demanding the immediate public release of Seoul's sinkhole safety map. 2025.04.02. hwang@newsis.com

The SMG's non-disclosure policy is facing strong opposition. Critics are suggesting that the city might be withholding the map out of concern that property values in high-risk areas could decline.

The Public Transport Workers' Union, Seoul Watch, and the Center for Information Rights held a joint press conference in front of Seoul City Hall on April 2nd, stating, "The Seoul Metropolitan Government created a sinkhole safety map last August after the sinkhole incident in Seodaemun-gu, categorizing the risk of ground subsidence into five levels. However, it is being shared only with autonomous districts and construction officials and is being withheld from the public. There is a widely circulating rumor that the real reason for this is related to real estate prices."   

The controversy surrounding the non-disclosure of the sinkhole safety map is evoking memories of the Seongsu Bridge collapse 31 years ago.

It has been revealed that the Seoul Metropolitan Government also withheld relevant safety information at the time of the Seongsu Bridge collapse.

Nine years before the Seongsu Bridge disaster in 1985, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) notified the Seoul Metropolitan Government of audit results indicating the risk of the bridge's collapse, but the city allegedly ignored these warnings.

At the time, the BAI stated that safety concerns were raised for 9 out of 15 Han River bridges. The three Han River bridges requiring urgent countermeasures due to the risk of collapse were the Yeongdong Bridge, Haengju Bridge, and Gwangjin Bridge. The six bridges requiring repairs due to cracks and corrosion were the Hannam Bridge, Mapo Bridge, Jamsil Bridge, Cheonho Bridge, Seongsu Bridge, and Yanghwa Bridge. In the case of the Seongsu Bridge, defects were found in five bridge bearings connecting the piers and girders and in one steel structure.

However, this information was not made public. Instead, the Seoul Metropolitan Government announced that there were no significant safety issues with the Han River bridges and elevated roads in Seoul. The reason cited was that disclosing the audit results, which indicated that more than half of the Han River bridges were at risk of collapse, ahead of the 1988 Olympics would cause public anxiety and damage national prestige.

The BAI also explained the situation at the time, stating, "We did not disclose the audit results at the request of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, which asked us not to do so before an important international event."

As a result, proper repairs were not carried out on the Seongsu Bridge, and its condition deteriorated. From 1990, failures in the upper truss connections became frequent, and from late 1992, the Seoul Metropolitan Government's Eastern Construction Office repeatedly urged the city to conduct an urgent detailed safety inspection.

Nevertheless, the city overlooked the seriousness of the issue, citing that the Seongsu Bridge was a bridge that had been constructed less than 20 years prior. In 1994, the Prime Minister's Office inspected 307 bridges in Seoul, but the Seongsu Bridge was reported to have no defects. The Seoul Metropolitan Government allegedly downplayed the safety issues of most bridges, fearing the repercussions if the inspection results were reported to the media as they were.

On October 20, 1994, at 9:30 PM, the day before the Seongsu Bridge collapse, a driver reported "feeling a significant sinking motion of the bridge deck while crossing the Seongsu Bridge," but the city did not restrict vehicle access. The city postponed welding work on the truss connections due to rain and merely covered the widened gaps in the deck with steel plates.

Ultimately, at around 7:40 AM on October 21, 1994, the upper deck between piers 10 and 11 of the Seongsu Bridge collapsed, resulting in the deaths of 32 people and injuries to 17 others.

The government created a white paper vowing not to repeat such accidents as the Seongsu Bridge collapse, but this did not help prevent the Sampoong Department Store collapse, another tragic disaster. The Supreme Prosecutors' Office published the 'Seongsu Bridge Collapse Accident Cause Investigation and Assessment Team Activity White Paper,' which recorded the causes of the Seongsu Bridge collapse. Coincidentally, the publication date was June 30, 1995, the day after the Sampoong Department Store collapse, which resulted in 502 deaths and 937 injuries.

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