The Judiciary’s Narrowed Standard on 'Subverting the Constitution' Questions the Duty to Defend Constitutional Order

KO YONG-CHUL Reporter

korocamia@naver.com | 2026-11-20 13:37:10

Judicial rulings often serve as a touchstone for gauging the constitutional standards of an era. The recent decision by the Supreme Court’s en banc panel to overturn a 15-year prison sentence and remand the case of former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo—who was charged with engaging in key duties of insurrection—has sparked intense controversy across the legal community and civil society. At the center of the debate is the majority opinion, backed by 9 out of 12 justices, which acquitted Han in principle regarding his "recommendation to convene a Cabinet meeting," ruling that his "purpose of subverting the Constitution" was not sufficiently proven.

In response to the ruling, civil society organizations, including MINBYUN - Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun) and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), have issued fierce criticisms. In a formal commentary, Minbyun condemned the Supreme Court’s decision as an act that "shakes the foundation of constitutional order," arguing that it provides a logic of absolution for a top-ranking public official. The core issue lies in the fairness of the legal standard applied to a Prime Minister standing at the center of state governance. As Minbyun pointed out, questions arise as to whether applying a lenient standard—treating someone who ordinarily wields immense power as a passive figure unaware of the gravity of a constitutional crisis—aligns with public legal sentiment and common sense. In the face of an unconstitutional declaration of martial law, a Cabinet member’s constitutional duty is not to facilitate mere procedural formalities, but to decisively check and block the abuse of power.

Even more noteworthy is the new legal doctrine introduced by the Supreme Court. Moving beyond existing precedents that deemed "willful negligence" (dolus eventualis) sufficient to establish the purpose of subverting the Constitution, the Court added a requirement to prove "an intent to pursue the realization of the act and tolerate its consequences." Minbyun countered that given the gravity of insurrection, which threatens the very existence of the state, proceeding with an action while recognizing it could paralyze constitutional institutions already warrants full culpability. The group warned that raising the threshold by requiring proof of ambiguous subjective intent not only retreats from established en banc precedents, but also risks serving as a blanket excuse for other defendants in ongoing insurrection trials. PSPD similarly denounced the ruling as an act of "volunteering to be a shield for insurrectionists," demanding accountability from the leadership of the judiciary.

Conversely, perspectives emphasizing strict burden of proof and the principle of legality in criminal trials might defend the majority opinion's intent to scrutinize a defendant's inner motives more rigorously. However, as demonstrated by the dissenting opinion of three justices, including Justice Oh Kyung-mi, who maintained that the act constituted a crime, evaluating the constitutional weight of a top official's actions remains sharply divided even within the Supreme Court.

The interpretation of law does not occur in a vacuum. Particularly when addressing grave threats to constitutional order, judicial rulings send an unmistakable signal to future public officials. Whether the stringent standard of proof for "subverting the Constitution" established by this remand will be remembered as a sophisticated refinement of the rule of law, or as a precedent that lightened the constitutional duties of those in power, remains a critical question as the case returns to the Seoul High Court.

[ⓒ Global Economic Times. 무단전재-재배포 금지]

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