DAEJEON, South Korea – The recent fire at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data center in Daejeon has once again brought the critical issue of government IT system continuity and redundancy to the forefront. The massive disruption, which has essentially paralyzed the nation's administrative network, highlights the government's failure to implement robust countermeasures, despite promising action following a major network failure just two years ago.

The blaze, which erupted on September 26, 2025, directly damaged 96 government administrative information systems. Officials are struggling to predict a recovery timeline because crucial dualization (redundancy) work had not been completed for these systems. Lee Yong-seok, Director-General for Digital Government Innovation at the Ministry of Interior and Safety, confirmed that while data backups exist, the necessary identical IT infrastructure to restore services at another location was not in place due to budgetary constraints.

The fire occurred in a section of NIRS's private cloud environment, the 'G-Cloud Zone.' This environment requires two types of Disaster Recovery (DR) systems: server DR and cloud DR. While the server DR was established, the essential cloud DR environment, which ensures business normalization during a disaster by building an identical system in a separate region, remained incomplete.

A History of Outages and Unmet Promises 

This incident echoes the widespread administrative network failure experienced in November 2023. That earlier event, caused by equipment malfunctions, crippled major public services like Government24, Saeol, Onnara, and Insa-rang, affecting public-facing services and internal civil servant operations nationwide for nearly the entire month.

In response to the 2023 debacle, the government promised a fundamental shift: transitioning the DR redundancy system to an 'Active-Active' configuration. This method involves two servers running simultaneously, allowing for a much faster response and seamless transition if one server fails.

Following this commitment, the government issued research services and launched a pilot project this year, with plans for various ministries and agencies to secure their own budgets to pursue the full dualization afterward. Tragically, the recent fire struck while NIRS was still in the preliminary phase, building out the infrastructure for the pilot project.

While some systems are dualized, an immediate switch to a backup facility remains challenging. Director-General Lee noted that while Daejeon and Gwangju centers have mutual recovery systems, these are often minimal in scale and vary by system. Consequently, they cannot be instantly activated, forcing the government to assess the damage before initiating restoration—a delay that has amplified public inconvenience.

The repeated, large-scale paralysis of essential administrative services has sparked severe criticism over the government’s system management, raising questions about accountability and the slow allocation of necessary funds for critical digital infrastructure security, despite explicit promises made two years ago.