(C) CTV News

As the world celebrates Christmas, a somber reality persists in South Korea. While many enjoy the festive season, hundreds of families are grieving the loss of loved ones who never returned from their workplaces. These are the victims of industrial accidents—mostly breadwinners who sacrificed their lives on the front lines of labor. Despite repeated vows for change, Korea’s "backward" industrial fatality rate remains a national tragedy.

According to recent data, 457 workers died in industrial accidents through September of this year, averaging 51 deaths per month. In response, the administration has declared a "War on Industrial Accidents." However, a critical question remains: Is the current strategy of simply expanding bureaucracy and increasing personnel the right path?

The Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) has prioritized upgrading its industrial safety unit and plans to triple the number of inspectors to 3,000 by 2028. For comparison, the United Kingdom—a global gold standard in workplace safety—maintains its record with only about 1,000 inspectors. The UK focuses on empowering local authorities for low-risk sites while keeping a lean, highly specialized central force.

The core issue in Korea is not the quantity of inspectors, but their quality. Currently, only 8.8% of Korean safety inspectors have more than ten years of experience. Doubling or tripling a workforce that lacks deep technical expertise risks creating an army of "ticket-issuers" who focus on administrative fines rather than actual accident prevention. To bridge this gap, the government should consider recruiting retired safety veterans from the private sector who possess decades of on-site engineering and risk-analysis experience.

Furthermore, a fundamental shift in the regulatory paradigm is required. British safety culture is built on the principle of "internal responsibility"—encouraging voluntary corporate management while intervening strictly only upon failure. The UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) acts as a specialized, independent regulatory body. In contrast, Korea remains tethered to a punitive, judicial approach where inspectors act more like police than consultants.

To achieve a meaningful reduction in fatalities, Korea must move industrial safety oversight out of the MOEL and into a unified, cross-departmental agency similar to the HSE. Modern industrial risks are complex and multifaceted; they cannot be managed by a single ministry's sub-organization.

True progress requires more than just hiring more staff; it demands a revolution in governance. While some argue that restructuring takes too much time, the shortest path to safety is often the one that addresses the root of the system. We must shift from "punishment after the fact" to "guidance for prevention." Without such a structural transformation, the promise of a safer Korea will remain an unfulfilled holiday wish.